Computationally efficient matrix multiplication is a fundamental requirement in various fields, including and particularly in data analytics. To do so, the computation task of a large-scale matrix multiplication is typically outsourced to multiple servers. However, due to data misusage at the servers, security is typically of concern. In this paper, we study the two-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, where a user is interested in the matrix product AB of two finite field private matrices A and B from an information-theoretic perspective. In this problem, the user exploits the computational resources of N servers to compute the matrix product, but simultaneously tries to conceal the private matrices from the servers. Our goal is twofold: (i) to maximize the communication rate, and, (ii) to minimize the effective number of server observations needed to determine AB, while preserving security, where we allow for up to ℓ ≤ N servers to collude. To this end, we propose a general aligned secret sharing scheme for which we optimize the matrix partition of matrices A and B in order to either optimize objective (i) or (ii) as a function of the system parameters (e.g., N and ℓ). A proposed inductive approach gives us analytical, close-to-optimal solutions for both (i) and (ii). With respect to (i), our scheme significantly outperforms the existing scheme of Chang and Tandon in terms of (a) communication rate, (b) maximum tolerable number of colluding servers and (c) computational complexity.
I. Introduction
In machine learning and scientific computation, matrix multiplication plays an important role. However, in many cases high memory requirements and computational effort is required.
Distributed approaches have been used to circumvent computational and memory related barriers of matrix multiplication [1] - [4] . Although distributed matrix multiplication can resolve computational and memory related difficulties, it causes new security problems. In the cryptography literature, different schemes have been proposed that balance security and efficiency of distributed matrix multiplication. Bultel et al. [5] suggest partially homomorphic encryption approaches in the framework of MapReduce matrix multiplication. In other related works, cryptographic techniques are applied to the problem of distributed matrix multiplication in cloud computing [6] , [7] .
As opposed to cryptographic techniques, information-theoretic techniques have been hardly applied to the problem of secure matrix multiplication. In [8] , Nodehi and Maddah-Ali apply information theory to the framework of limited-sharing multi-party computation. In limited-sharing multi-party computation, a set of sources offload the computation task, i.e., computing a polynomial function of input matrices available at the sources, to a set of servers. The result of the computation has to be delivered to a master node. The authors propose an efficient polynomial sharing scheme that minimizes the number of required servers (which is known as recovery threshold) while preserving the privacy of colluding servers and the master. Similar schemes have been applied to the context of non-uniform computation delays at the servers [9] .
In [10] , Chang and Tandon study the communication rate of a secure matrix multiplication problem consisting of a single user and N curious servers which are responsible for the computation of two matrices available at the user. The communication rate is seeked to be maximized when ℓ servers collude. The authors divide the security problem in two models.
(i) One-sided: Only one of the two matrices is private. The other matrix is publicly available at all servers.
(ii) Two-sided: Both matrices stored at the user are private and not available at the servers.
While for the one-sided model, they characterize the capacity with respect to the commu- the converse, their proposed scheme for the second model seems to be loose in terms of communication rate and the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers supporting a non-zero rate.
In this paper, we propose a novel aligned secret sharing scheme under arbitrary matrix partition for the two-sided model to optimize the two conflicting metrics -(i) rate and (ii) recovery threshold. To this end, we formulate two optimization problems, (i) one which maximizes the rate and (ii) the other which minimizes the number of effective server needed when computing AB subject to a minimum rate constraint. Both optimization problems find the optimal matrix partition of the matrices A and B. Through an inductive approach, we find analytical, close-to-optimal solutions of the optimization problems. These solutions identify the optimal matrix partition as a function of N and ℓ and a minimum rate requirement R th .
With respect to objective (i), our scheme significantly improves upon the scheme of Chang and Tandon in terms of rate, computational complexity on the servers and the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers. While the maximum number of tolerable colluding servers of the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon is equal to ⌊ √ N −1⌋, our scheme attains a non-zero rate for up to ⌊ (N−1) /2⌋ colluding servers. Despite of the higher communication rate in comparison to [10] , our scheme attains a lower computational complexity at the servers.
Notations: Throughout this paper, boldface lower-case and capital letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively. Further, for any two integers a, b with a ≤ b, we define 
II. System Model
In a fully, or two-sided, secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in computing the matrix product AB of two private matrices A ∈ F m×n and B ∈ F n×p1 securely (see Fig. 1 ). Hereby, the user has access to a distributed computation system consisting of N honest, but curious computation servers connected to the user by private, error-free links.
The user seeks the support of these servers but aims at concealing A and B from the servers.
To this end, the user deploys encoding functions f i and g i to generate securely encoded
which are sent to the i-th server. The set of all N encoding functions with respect to matrices A and B are denoted by f = ( f 1 , . . ., f N ) and
Since every server i is by assumption honest, the answer of the i-th server denoted by Z i is a deterministic function 2 ofÃ i andB i , i.e.,
The user has to be able to determine AB after applying the decoding function d(·) on the collection of all N answers Z 1 , . . . , Z N . i.e., AB = d(Z 1 , . . ., Z N ), or information-theoretically satisfy the decodability constraint
In this paper, we study the (N, ℓ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem. In this setting, security has to be preserved when ℓ ≤ N servers may collude. In other words,
secrecy has to be maintained. Thus,Ã L andB L do not reveal any information on the private matrices A and B. This is expressed information-theoretically by the security constraint
Next, we define two conflicting metrics -(i) rate and (ii) recovery threshold -which we seek to optimize in subsequent sections.
1 Each element is from a sufficiently large field F.
2 This function is known by the user.
First, we say the rate R N,ℓ is achievable if there exists f, g and d(·) satisfying the decodability and security constraints. The rate R N,ℓ is the ratio between the number of desired bits vs. the number of downloaded bits and is thus given by
The capacity C is the supremum of R N,ℓ over all achievable schemes.
Second, we call a secure matrix multiplication strategy to be ω 
III. Aligned secret sharing scheme with Matrix Partition
In an (N, ℓ) fully secure matrix multiplication problem, a user is interested in computing AB using N servers without revealing ℓ colluding servers information about A and B.
To this end, the user breaks A vertically into r A sub-matrices and B horizontally into r B sub-matrices, i.e.,
Thus, we get A and B by concatenating the sub-matrices
. The number of rows m and n are multiple of r A and r B , respectively.
Under the proposed matrix partition, the matrix product is given by
The user encodes the matrices A and B according tõ
, where all entries of matrices K A 1 , . . ., K A ℓ ∈ F (m/r A )×n and K B 1 , . . ., K B ℓ ∈ F n×(p/r B ) are i.i.d. uniform random variables. The exponents of the x i are carefully chosen to facilitate the alignment of undesired components [11] . Details are discussed in the next paragraph.
The user sends the pair Ã i ,B i to the server where server i in return computes Z i =Ã iBi and sends its answer Z i back to the user. The user seeks to retrieve AB by observing up
The polynomial corresponds to
and is given by
To reconstruct AB, the user is interested in p 1 (x). The remaining terms p i (x), i = 2, . . . , 4, can be thought of interference. Thus, with respect to p 1 (x) each exponent in x needs to have only one attributable item A j B j ′ to distinguish desired components from each other and also from undesired components
One can verify that each exponent of p 1 (x) does not occur in the remaining undesired terms p i (x), i = 2, . . ., 4. In contrast, there are multiple items assigned to the remaining exponents not being included in p 1 (x). In other words, we align multiple undesired items to single exponents. Thus, this scheme is called an aligned secret sharing scheme. A pictorial representation of the association of components to exponents is provided in Fig. 2 . The exponents of x i inÃ i andB i are 3 We frequently omit using the first or the second subscript when N or ℓ remain constant, e.g., we simply write Q to denote Q N,ℓ for constant (N, ℓ). In almost all cases where N is of no concern, we omit the first index and write Q ℓ . In contrast, the remaining r A + 2ℓ − 1 exponents of p 2 (x), p 3 (x) or p 4 (x) are subject to (subspace) alignment of at least two components.
Recall that the polynomial p(x) has a degree of Q − 1 and the user has access to N observations. In order to enable decoding, we have to ensure that the degree of the polynomial does not exceed the total number of available servers, or observations, N, i.e.,
Thus, the user can retrieve its desired items by using polynomial interpolation. Since the user recovers r A r B desired items out of Q N,ℓ (r A , r B ) calculated items, the aligned secret sharing scheme achieves a rate of
In order to maximize the rate R N,ℓ (r A , r B ) 4 , we need to solve the optimization problem
We denote the optimal decision variables and objective value of (6) Further, we note that the effective number of server observations the user needs to determine the matrix product AB is Q. Thus, the aligned secret sharing strategy is Qsecurely recoverable. In order to make the aligned secret sharing scheme less prone to slower computing servers, or stragglers, one has to solve the optimization problem
subject to
The optimization problems (6) and (7) find the best choice of how to partition the left and right matrices at the user for given N and ℓ (and a minimum rate requirement R th ≤ R ⋆ in (7)). For both problems, we propose close-to-optimal analytical solutions. The solutions to the rate maximization problem (6) and Q-secure recoverability problem are stated in Theorem 1 and 2, respectively. To differentiate the (optimal) solution of (7) from (6), we use the breve mark (˘) instead of the star symbol ( ⋆ ), e.g.,Q instead of Q ⋆ .
IV. Solution of the Matrix Partitioning Problem (6) and Discussion
Theorem 1. The solution (r A ,r B ) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization problem (6) for given parameters N and ℓ. Hereby,
andr A is the largest possible integer r A ≥ 1 that satisfies the inequality
Proof. The proof is based on the inductive approach of deriving the relationship between consecutive optimal solution pairs (r ⋆ ). Ultimately, under some additional approximations, this helps us in deriving (8) and (9) . For further details, we refer the reader to Section A.
Remark 1 (Upper bound). The best information-theoretic upper bound known of the twosided matrix multiplication problem on the rate is derived in [10] . The upper bound of the two-sided model is in fact the one-sided model for which the capacity is known to be
Remark 2. Compared to the scheme proposed by Chang and Tandon (CT) [10, Theorem 2], our aligned secret sharing scheme significantly improves on the communication rate (see Fig. 3 ). This is illustrated in Fig. 3 Remark 3 (Additive gap). To evaluate the quality of our proposed analytical solution, we evaluate the maximum additive gap max ℓ∈[N] |R ⋆ ℓ −R ℓ | (see Fig. 4 ). Hereby, R ⋆ ℓ denotes the optimal rate of the optimization problem (6) andR ℓ our proposed estimate. The optimal solution is determined in a brute-force fashion by exhaustive search which is costly in computation. Numerical results show that the proposed solution is at most 3·10 −2 additively off from the optimal solution.
Remark 4. Our proposed solution is frequently the optimal solution. Fig. 5 shows the number of sub-optimal solutions of the provided estimation to the optimization problem (6) for a given N and variable ℓ. In theory, for a given N, the number of sub-optimal solutions is upper bounded by N. Interestingly, this figure shows that '# sub-optimal solutions ≪ N'.
This suggests that our solution solves (6) for almost all ℓ ∈ [N] optimally except of very few cases where an almost negligible additive gap is attained.
Remark 5 (Server computational complexity). We define the per-server computational complexity as the number of necessary multiply-accumulate (MAC) operations to determine Z i =Ã iBi . Clearly, the MAC complexity under a general r A and r B -partition of matrices A and B becomes Θ mnp r A r B . Recall that the denominator r A r B < N represents the dimension reserved for desired sub-block matrix products. For constant N and ℓ, our secret sharing scheme achieves (in comparison to CTs scheme) the better alignment efficiency and thus a larger product r A r B . This in return, results in an improved per-server complexity when m, n and p remain constant.
Remark 6 (User decoding complexity). The decoding at the user can be interpreted as an interpolation of a Q − 1-degree polynomial for mp r A r B times. Hereby, the complexity of a t-degree polynomial interpolation is O(t log 2 t log log t) [12] . Thus, the decoding complexity at the user is of order O(mp log 2 η log log η) with η = max{r A , ℓ} r B .
Remark 7 (Recovery threshold). The effective number of server observations the user needs to determine the matrix product AB is (after rate maximization) Q ⋆ . In the problem (6), it is desirable to choose r A and r B as large as possible without violating the inequality constraint Q ≤ N. Typically, after rate maximization we obtain highly straggler-dependent solutions for which Q ⋆ ≈ N.
Remark 8 (Input matrix dimension). Recall that the user splits the input matrices A and
B into r A sub-matrices A i ∈ F (m/r A )×n and r B sub-matrices B j ∈ F n×(p/r B ) . According to Theorem 1, we can easily show from (8)
and based on that from (9)
This suggests that for feasibility in the matrix partitioning, p and m shall (at least) scale according to Θ( N /ℓ) and Θ( √ Nℓ), respectively.
V. Solution of the Matrix Partitioning Problem (7)
Theorem 2. The solution (r A ,r B ) is a close-to-optimal analytical solution to the optimization problem (7) for a given parameter R th which is feasible with respect to the given parameters N und ℓ. Hereby,r B = max 1,
andr A is the smallest possible integer r A ≥ 1 that satisfies the inequality
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The current version of this paper does not include a detailed proof.
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the two-sided secure matrix multiplication problem, where a user is interested in the matrix product AB of two private matrices A and B. The user tries to conceal the private matrices from N servers (where we allow for up to ℓ servers to collude), but uses them to compute the matrix product. We propose a partition-based aligned secret sharing scheme. Next, we formulate and solve two optimization problems that determine the optimal matrix partition of input matrices A and B to (i) maximize the communication rate of this scheme and (ii) to maximize the recovery threshold. With respect to objective (i), numerical results show that this scheme significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art scheme of Chang and Tandon presented in [10] . In summary, our work shows that appropriate matrix partition is of importance in enabling rate-efficient, straggler-robust and secure two-sided distributed matrix computation.
Appendix A Close-to-optimal Solution of Optimization Problem (6) Next, we propose a close-to-optimal solution to the optimization problem (6) . To establish this solution, we need the following lemmas. 
We infer from inequality (12) Proof. Define
We set (r A , r B ) = (1 + a, 1 + b), where a, b ∈ Z + ∪ {0}, such that the number of exploited servers equals
The only feasible pair (a, b) satisfying the inequality constraint of the optimization problem (6) is (a, b) = (0, 0). Therefore the only maximizing pair of the optimization problem (6) Proof. The rate for any pair (r A , r B ) ∈ Z + 2 is given by and we simultaneously increase r A by one (r A ← r A + 1) while keeping r B constant (i) has no effect on the number of exploited servers and keeps it atQ Q ℓ (r A , r B ), (ii) generates a new strongly feasible pair (r A + 1, r B ) at ℓ − 1 and (iii) increases the rate additively by
Proof. Consider the pairs r 1,A , r 1,B and r 2,A , r 2,B , where r 2,A = r 1,A + 1 and r 2,B = r 1,B .
The number of exploited servers for the pair r 2,A , r 2,B with ℓ 2 = ℓ 1 − 1 colluding servers is given byQ
From Q ℓ 2 = Q ℓ 1 , (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4 readily follow. The rate associated with the pair r 2,A , r 2,B then becomes results in an increase of the rate for both of the pairs (r 1,A , r 1,B ) and (r 2,A , r 2,B ) . The additive increase in the rate for the pair (r 2,A , r 2,B ) is larger than for the pair (r 1,A , r 1,B ) .
Proof. We have r 1,A + 1 ≥ r 1,B so that
follows. Since (r 1,A , r 1,B ) is a strongly feasible pair (cf. Definition 1), neither r 1,A nor r 1,B
can increase while the other element of the pair (r 1,A , r 1,B ) remains constant. Recall that
Incrementing r 1,A by one increases Q ℓ by r 1,B + 1. Similarly, increasing r 1,B by one enlarges Q ℓ by r 1,A + ℓ. Moreover, r 1,A ≥ r 1,B and ℓ ≥ 1 implies
Therefore, strong feasibility along with above observation suggests that Q ℓ is at least N −r 1,B .
We remind the reader that as long as Q ℓ < N − r 1,B , the strong feasibility assumption is violated. As a result, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r 1,A , r 1,B )
is lower bounded according to
On the other hand, the number of exploited servers for the strongly feasible pair (r 2,A , r 2,B ) is bounded from above by
Combining inequalities (15), (17) and r 1,B ≤ r 2,B , we get A , r 2,B ) .
Hereby,
Q ℓ (r 1,A ,r 1,B ) and
Q ℓ (r 2,A ,r 2,B ) are the corresponding terms by which the rate increases after subjecting the pairs (r 1,A , r 1,B ) and (r 2,A , r 2,B ) to the mapping of Lemma 4. ).
We denote the rate increase from the rate pairr ℓ 1 to r ⋆ ℓ 2 when ℓ decreases by one
←r ℓ 2 ) refers to the rate
). Thus, the overall achievable rates at pairs r ⋆ ℓ 2 andr ℓ 2 correspond to
Due to Lemma 5, we have
). Consequently, we infer from (19) and (20) 
). However, this violates the assumption of optimality at r ⋆ However, if we relax the integer assumption on ℓ m and ℓ m−1 , we can find an ℓ m such that m = m ′ + 1. This is shown in Fig. 6 (by the step functions in the interval ℓ m ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓ m ′).
We will see at the end of this appendix that the values of m which are not associated to (positive) integer-valued ℓ m are excluded from the results by using the integer assumption. 
5 Recall that we move backwards from ℓ max to ℓ min . 
Assuming that the number of exploited servers is almost constant, i.e., Q 
where m ∈ Z + \ {1}. Next, we calculateQ ℓ m for the pair (r ℓ m ,A , m) as followŝ 
. 
Due to Lemma 1, we choose the smallest m that satisfies (32). This gives uŝ r ℓ,B = − 3 2
for ℓ ∈ (l m+1 ,l m ] with ℓ ∈ Z + . By using the ceiling function, the values ofr ℓ,B which do not correspond to integer numbers are removed for integers ℓ. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
